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Abstract
This Essay examines the Bush Administration’s use of a tactic in the “War on Terror” called
“extraordinary rendition.” The term extraordinary rendition refers to the process by which alleged
terrorists are captured by the U.S. Government, transferred to another country, interrogated, and
possibly tortured–all without judicial involvement–so the U.S. Government may attempt to un-
cover possible terrorist activity. Extraordinary rendition thus differs from ordinary forms of ren-
dition, since the latter refers broadly to any circumstance where a government takes or transfers
custody of a person by means of procedures outside those of extradition treaties.
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This Essay examines the Bush Administration's use of a tac-
tic in the "War on Terror" called "extraordinary rendition." The
term extraordinary rendition refers to the process by which al-
leged terrorists are captured by the U.S. Government, trans-
ferred to another country, interrogated, and possibly tortured-
all without judicial involvement-so the U.S. Government may
attempt to uncover possible terrorist activity.' Extraordinary
rendition thus differs from ordinary forms of rendition, since
the latter refers broadly to any circumstance where a govern-
ment takes or transfers custody of a person by means of proce-
dures outside those of extradition treaties.2
Within academia, issues like extraordinary rendition are
often framed as moral dilemmas. As legal practitioners writing
for an academic setting, therefore, we would be wise to begin by
examining moral dilemmas generally. We begin by noting that
they are a common teaching technique. Anyone who has taken
an introductory philosophy class in college will recognize the fol-
lowing exotic hypothetical scenarios:
(1) Your best friend knocks on your door, tells you that he is
being chased by police, and asks to hide with you. He doesn't
explain why he is being chased. You let him in and, a few
minutes later, you hear a knock on the door. It's the police,
asking whether you know where your friend is. Do you lie to
save your friend or tell the truth out of respect for the legiti-
macy of police authority?
(2) A baby is about to crawl onto a button that will detonate a
chemical weapon that, in turn, would cause millions to expe-
rience extreme and incurable, but not fatal, illness. The only
* Respectively, Partner and Associate, at Arent Fox LLP in New York City. This
Article grew out of a speech delivered by Mr. Silkenat at the Colloquium on Guanta-
namo held on November 29, 2006 at Fordham University School of Law.
1. See generally ASS'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y., TORTURE BY PROXY: INTERNA-
TIONAL AND DOMESTIC LAw APPLICABLE TO "EXTRAORDINARY RENDITIONS" (2004) [herein-
after TORTURE BY PROXY].
2. See id. at 5.
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hope to stop her is to shoot her with a high-powered rifle. Do
you shoot the baby?
Philosophy professors understand (we hope) that their stu-
dents will never face moral dilemmas as stark as these. In the
world of philosophy classes, these dilemmas are supposed to be
"unrealistic" so that they can illustrate an abstract concept in the
purest possible way. Typically, these moral dilemmas are so
highly structured that there are no creative or otherwise "smart-
alecky" ways to escape from choosing among pre-selected op-
tions: in the first case, no, the student cannot choose to be silent
rather than lie or tell the truth; in the second case, the student is
not allowed to shoot in front of the baby, to scare him away from
the button.
A second property of moral dilemmas is that, once we sup-
press our "smart-alecky" impulses and accept the rules of the
game, they are emotionally compelling. In the Academy Award
winning movie Sophie's Choice, the heroine is told by a Nazi guard
that she must choose which of her two children will live and
which will die.3 If she cannot choose, both of them will be mur-
dered. 4 In the film version of Les Miserables, Jean Valjean is an
ex-convict who years ago broke his parole and has since built a
new life as an honest man and a philanthropist.' When a va-
grant and petty thief is captured and wrongly identified as him,
however, Valjean must decide whether to turn himself in to the
police, and thus endanger those who depend upon him for their
livelihood, or to keep silent and let another, perhaps unworthy,
man go to jail in his place. 6 In the more recent, albeit less high-
brow, movie The Devil's Advocate, Keanu Reeves plays a lawyer
who must choose between professional duties and personal am-
bitions, on the one hand, and emotional commitments and his
individual sense of justice on the other.7
Of all the various forms of moral dilemmas, Americans have
always had a particular soft spot for the "mad bomber" scenario,
where the hero has only days/hours/seconds to find the loca-
3. See SOPHIE'S CHOICE (Universal Pictures 1982).
4. See id.
5. See LES MIARABLES (Columbia Pictures 1998).
6. See id.
7. See THE DEVIL'S ADVOCATE (Warner Bros. Studios 1988).
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tion of a bomb, known only to a suspect in custody.8 Does the
hero torture the suspect in hopes of finding the bomb? Until
recently, the most famous example of such dilemmas appeared
in Dirty Harry, the 1971 film in which Clint Eastwood, as the title
character, tortures a serial killer in order to make him reveal the
location of a captive child.9 Because of Harry's tactics, a court
later throws out evidence against the killer and releases him
back into the public. 10 This particular conceit, the battle be-
tween the solitary hero and the conformist bureaucrats who try
to stop him, has become a fixture of post-Dirty Harry action mov-
ies."l
Today, of course, we have an entire banquet of mad bomber
scenarios, courtesy of Jack Bauer and friends, from the first sev-
eral seasons of the television show 24.12 Here is a partial list of
the scenarios where characters, good and evil alike, resort to tor-
ture in order to elicit needed information:
(1) Season 2, Episodes 11 & 12 (6:00-8:00 p.m.): National
Security Advisor Roger Stanton is arrested for treason and in-
terrogated after President David Palmer finds evidence that
Stanton is part of a plot to detonate a nuclear bomb over Los
Angeles, and that he knows the location of the bomb. During
the interrogation, a Secret Service agent places Stanton's feet
in a bucket of water and electrically shocks him with what ap-
pears to be a defibrillator. The torture lasts approximately
forty-five minutes in the show's chronology.' 3
(2) In the same episodes, terrorist suspect Syed Ali, also a
conspirator in the Los Angeles bombing, is interrogated by
Jack Bauer. He is beaten in the head and stomach and forced
to watch a staged video of his eldest son being shot to death.14
(3) Season 2, Episode 19 (2:00-3:00 AM): Jack Bauer is cap-
tured by the underlings of a war profiteer. The torturers be-
8. See, e.g., MAN ON FIRE (Fox 2000 Studios 2004); THE SIEGE (20th Century Fox
1998)
9. DIRTY HARRY (Warner Bros. Studios 1971).
10. Id.
11. See, e.g., ABOVE THE LAW (Warner Bros. Studios 1988); DIE HARD (20th Century
Fox 1988); FIRST BLOOD (Carolco Pictures 1982).
12. 24 (Fox Broad. Co. 2001-2007).
13. 24: Day 2: 6:00 p.m. - 7:00 p.m. (Fox Broad. Co. television broadcast Feb. 4,
2003); 24: Day 2: 7:00 p.m. - 8:00 p.m. (Fox Broad. Co. television broadcast Feb. 11,
2003).
14. Id.
2007]
538 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 30:535
lieve that he knows of the location of a computer chip that
contains evidence that, if revealed, would prevent the war
they want to incite. He is stripped naked, gagged, and then
cut in the lower stomach with a surgeon's scalpel. When he
faints, he is awakened with a harsh chemical agent and then
burned in the lower stomach with acid.
15
(4) Season 3, Episode 7 (7:00-8:00 PM): Gael, a Counter Ter-
rorism Unit ("CTU") agent, is suspected of working as a mole
for a drug cartel. CTU believes he can lead them to the drug
cartel. During interrogation, he is injected in the neck with
an unknown substance, which appears to cause him great
pain. 6
(5) Season 4, Episode 8 (2:00-3:00 PM): Sarah, a CTU em-
ployee, is wrongly accused of being a mole for a terrorist
group. CTU believes she is the only one who can prevent a
meltdown at six nuclear plants. She is taken into interroga-
tion and repeatedly shocked with a taser. At the end of the
episode, she is carried out of the room in a wheelchair, un-
conscious. The interrogation takes place over approximately
forty-five minutes.' 
7
Meanwhile, real-life variations of mad bomber scenarios are also
unfolding according to their own chronologies. In the case of
extraordinary rendition, we might be drawing near the series fi-
nale.
The best evidence available to the public indicates that the
U.S. Government has engaged in a program of extraordinary
rendition since the Clinton Administration, and that the Bush
Administration expanded and emboldened this program after
September 11, 2001.18 Journalists and human rights activists esti-
mate that the number of people transferred to other countries
under the program could number several hundred. 9 While the
Bush Administration enjoyed popular support and the Republi-
can Party controlled the U.S. Congress, the public had little
15. 24: Day 2: 2:00 a.m. - 3:00 a.m. (Fox Broad. Co. television broadcast Apr. 15,
2003).
16. 24: Day 3: 7:00 p.m. - 8:00p.m. (Fox Broad. Co. television broadcast Dec. 9,
2003).
17. 24: Day 4: 2:00 p.m. - 3:00 p.m. (Fox Broad. Co. television broadcast Feb. 7,
2005).
18. SeeJane Mayer, Outsourcing Torture: The Secret History of America's "Extraordinary
Rendition"Program, NEW YORKER, Feb. 14, 2005, at 106, 108-09.
19. See id. at 107.
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more than scattered evidence concerning what the program was
and who ran it. The recent change of control of both Houses of
the U.S. Congress, however, might turn a spotlight on the Ad-
ministration's policies. Democratic Senators Patrick Leahy (D-
Vt.) and Carl Levin (D-Mi.), Chairmen of the Senate Judiciary
Committee and the Senate Armed Services Committee, respec-
tively, have both announced that they will begin hearings on the
Bush Administration's use of interrogation tactics, including ex-
traordinary rendition.2" During 2007, it is likely that the U.S.
public will confront some of the government agents who made
their own decisions regarding the fate of "mad bombers" and, as
reports increasingly make clear, a large number of "not-so-mad"
innocent bystanders. 21
This Essay addresses questions that are likely to emerge
from any public debate over extraordinary rendition. First, is ex-
traordinary rendition illegal? This Essay shows that there is a
growing consensus among legal scholars that extraordinary ren-
dition violates both U.S. law and international treaty responsibili-
ties. Second, if extraordinary rendition is illegal, how should we
treat those who engaged in this tactic? Are these government
agents real-life Jack Bauers, or are there other issues involved?
I. EXTRAORDINARY RENDITION IS ILLEGAL
Both practicing lawyers and legal academics understand
that controversial legal questions rarely have clear answers. Ex-
traordinary rendition should be an exception. There are plenty
of good reasons to believe that extraordinary rendition is illegal
and no good reasons to believe it is legal.
The legal arguments against extraordinary rendition have
already been elaborated elsewhere, specifically in the report Tor-
ture by Proxy: International and Domestic Law Applicable to "Ex-
traordinary Rendition," produced jointly by the Association of the
Bar of the City of New York and the Center for Human Rights
and Global Justice at New York University.22
20. See Guy Dinmore, Pressure Grows on U.S. Rendition Policy; U.S. Congress, Now
Under Democratic Control, is Set to Ask Awkward Questions, FIN, TIMES (London), Nov. 21,
2006, at 6; Jim Kuhnhenn, Dems Prepare Slew of Oversight Hearings, WASHINGTONPOST.
COM,Jan. 6, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/01/
06/AR2007010600518.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2007).
21. See Torture by Proxy, supra note 1, at 9-12.
22. Id. See generally Jordan L. Paust, Executive Plans and Authorizations to Violate Inter-
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First, extraordinary rendition in cases where the suspect is
apprehended at a U.S. airport or other immigration checkpoint
is clearly governed by and normally a violation of the Foreign
Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act ("FARRA") of 1998.23
Under FARRA:
It shall be the policy of the United States not to expel, extra-
dite, or otherwise effect the involuntary return of any person
to a country in which there are substantial grounds for believ-
ing the person would be in danger of being subjected to tor-
ture, regardless of whether the person is physically present in
the United States.
2 4
Where a domestic U.S. Government agency, such as the Justice
Department or the Department of Homeland Security, appre-
hends someone without formally charging the person with links
to terrorism, FARRA is, in fact, the final word.
In the case of those persons who might plausibly have ties to
terrorism and who are apprehended at a U.S. airport or other
checkpoint, the law allows the government some discretion.
Under FARRA, members of certain classes of non-citizens identi-
fied in the Immigration and Naturalization Act, such as Nazi war
criminals and persons designated by the Attorney General as
threats to national security, may be turned over to other govern-
ments, even if there is reason to believe they will be tortured.2 5
The "national security threat" exception specifically allows the
Attorney General to exclude from FARRA protection those sus-
pected of engaging in terrorist activity.2 6 As Torture by Proxy
national Law Concerning Treatment and Interrogation of Detainees, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 811 (2005) (arguing that the Bush Administration planned to violate customary and
treaty-based international law and that these violations should have criminal implica-
tions); David Weissbrodt & Amy Berquist, Extraordinary Rendition: A Human Rights Anal-
ysis, 19 HARv. HUM. RTs. J. 123 (2006) (describing human rights implications of ex-
traordinary rendition and other extralegal rendition methods); Margaret L. Satter-
thwaite, Rendered Meaningless: Extraordinary Rendition and the Rule of Law, 75 GEo. WASH.
L. REv. (forthcoming 2007) (working paper, N.Y. Univ. Sch. of L. Pub. L. & Legal The-
ory Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 06-36), available at http://ssm.com/
abstract=945711 (determining that extraordinary rendition violates international legal
norms and U.S. constitutional protections).
23. Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998 ("FARRA"), Pub. L. No.
105-277, Div. G, § 2242, 112 Stat. 2681-764, 822 (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 8 U.S.C.).
24. Id. § 2242(a), 112 Stat. 2681-822.
25. See8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (4) (D), 1231(b) (3) (B) (2006).
26. See id. § 1227(a) (4) (B).
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notes, however, even those persons specifically identified by the
Attorney General as national security threats "are able nonethe-
less to apply for a deferral of removal ... which provides protection
from transfer.
27
In practice, however, the minimal protection of the deferral
process has not been available to some captured suspects. The
case of Maher Arar, a Canadian citizen of Syrian descent, is a
prime example.2" Arar was returning to Toronto after vacation-
ing with family in Tunisia, when he was apprehended in New
York during a flight layover. 29 Based on circumstantial evidence
connecting Arar with the brother of a man tied to terrorist orga-
nizations, Attorney General John Ashcroft approved the Justice
Department's request to transfer Arar to Syria.3° At that point,
the law should have allowed Arar to apply for a deferral, but he
was never given that opportunity. Arar was flown to Jordan,
where he was beaten by local police and then sent by van to
Syria, where he was further tortured. 1 He remained in a Syrian
prison for a year and a half before the Canadian Government
intervened to have him released.3 2 Arar was never charged with
any offense, and was subsequently cleared by Canadian courts of
all ties with terrorist organizations or activities. 3
In cases where a suspect is apprehended in another country,
such as those of Ahmed Agiza and Mohammed al-Zari in Sweden
and Hadj Boudella in Bosnia,34 FARRA appears to have been ig-
nored, despite the language indicating that it applies regardless
of whether or not the suspect is physically present in the United
States. As the authors of Torture by Proxy note, the agencies that
would have been in charge of extraordinary renditions that
originated abroad, especially the Central Intelligence Agency
("CIA"), have not publicly issued any of their own regulations.3 5
27. Torture by Proxy, supra note 1, at 21 (emphasis in original).
28. Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250 (E.D.N.Y. 2006).
29. See id. at 252-53.
30. See id. at 254.
31. See id. at 254-55.
32. See id. at 255.
33. See Mayer, supra note 18, at 106; see also COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO THE Ac-
TIONS OF CANADIAN OFFICIALS IN RELATION TO MAHER ARAR, REPORT OF THE Evwc'rs RE-
LATING TO MAHER ARAR: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 13-14 (2006), available at
http://www.ararcommission.ca/eny/26.htm.
34. See Mayer, supra note 18, at 118, 123.
35. See Torture by Proxy, supra note 1, at 26, 30.
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Thus, there is no indication that the CIA has any procedure for
appealing its conclusion that an individual is a national security
threat or for allowing any sort of deferral analogous to those of-
fered by domestic agencies. It is possible that the CIA has issued
its own secret regulations pursuant to FARRA. If it has, these
secret regulations themselves must not contradict the law.
FARRA requires that in all cases, even when dealing with sus-
pected terrorists, U.S. Government actions must be consistent
with the "obligations of the United States under the [U.N. Con-
vention against Torture], subject to any reservations, under-
standings, declarations, and provisos contained in the United
States Senate resolution of ratification of the Convention." 36
FARRA was enacted in order to implement the United
States' obligations under the U.N. Convention Against Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punish-
ment ("CAT"). 7  International law scholars argue that the
United States has systematically misinterpreted these obligations
and its related obligations under the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR") .38 The primary issue schol-
ars raise is that of territoriality: Do these human rights treaties
only apply to persons within a signatory's physical territory? The
United States has long maintained that its reservations to these
treaties specifically limit their scope to territory under U.S. juris-
diction. Administration lawyers are now applying this traditional
reservation to the problem of extraordinary renditions.3 9
As Margaret Satterthwaite points out in her article, Rendered
36. Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act ("FARRA") of 1998, Pub. L. No.
105-277, Div G., § 2242(c), 112 Stat. 2681-764, 822 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 8 U.S.C.).
37. U.N. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment ("CAT"), Dec. 10, 1984, 112 Stat. 2681, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85.
38. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171; see, e.g., Kristen D.A. Carpenter, The International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights: A Toothless Tiger?, 26 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 1 (2000) (arguing that
"American courts are not truly interpreting the international covenant, but assume its
protections to be coextensive with those already provided by the American Constitu-
tion."); John Fitzpatrick, The Unreality of International Law in the United States and the
Lagrand Case, 27 YALE J. INT'L L. 427, 428 (2002); Margaret Thomas, "Rogue States"
within American Borders: Remedying State Noncompliance with the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, 90 CAL. L. REv. 165 (2002) (arguing that "Congress has yet to
enact legislation implementing the Treaty nationally, and courts and state legislatures
have paid scant attention to the document.").
39. See Satterthwaite, supra note 22, at 16.
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Meaningless, the territoriality argument is a red herring. Sat-
tarthwaite gives as an example the travaux pr6paratoires of the
ICCPR and CAT, and finds that they do not support the Admin-
istration's argument. The travaux indicate that the United States
argued for a territorial limitation on its obligations because it
did not want to be put in a position where its treaty obligations
would require it to enter the jurisdiction of another sovereign
State in order to prevent human rights abuses.4 ° This seemed
like a violation of the traditional concept of State sovereignty
and a requirement that the United States act as a global police
force. Such sovereignty concerns do not apply in cases of ex-
traordinary rendition. In such cases, the United States has al-
ready entered another territory and has already taken a suspect
into custody. Any violation of sovereignty has already occurred.
Applying the territorial argument to extraordinary rendition
would essentially allow the United States to circumvent its nor-
mal obligations under human rights law by preemptively violat-
ing other norms of international law.4 1
The case of Abu Omar, an Egyptian-born resident of Italy,
provides a good example of the difficulty of applying the territo-
riality argument to extraordinary rendition. In 2003, Abu Omar
was abducted by the CIA, in violation of Italian law, and taken to
Egypt to be tortured.42 Subsequently, an Italian judge issued ar-
rest warrants for the CIA agents involved in the abduction,
charging them with kidnapping.43 Under the current Adminis-
tration's interpretation of the territoriality rule, Abu Omar, once
illegally abducted from Italy, was not entitled to protection
under the ICCPR or CAT because such protection might require
the United States to entangle itself in the internal affairs of an-
other country.44
Satterthwaite and the authors of Torture by Proxy argue that
all but the most cynical readings of U.S. treaty obligations com-
pel us to conclude that extraordinary rendition violates recog-
nized standards of international law. In the coming year, con-
gressional hearings may confirm the arguments of many legal
experts outside the Bush Administration-that the actual poli-
40. See id. at 16-17.
41. See id. at 22.
42. See id. at 7-8.
43. See id. at 7.
44. See id.
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cies followed by the CIA and other agencies with regard to ex-
traordinary rendition violate U.S. domestic law.
II. EXTRAORDINARY RENDITION IS NOT A 24 PLOT
If extraordinary rendition is in fact contrary to U.S. and in-
ternational law, we seem to be roaring along toward our 24-like
cliffhanger: should our heroes break the law to save thousands
of innocent lives or uphold the law for the protection of people
who might be terrorists? One can picture the climax, where the
grizzled, world-weary CIA agent confronts the bleeding-heart
human rights activists and timid government bureaucrats on the
U.S. Senate Committee and explains to them how the world re-
ally works.
In our rush to find an agonizing moral dilemma, though,
we should not confuse the reality of extraordinary rendition with
the scripted world of 24. Accepting that in both the show and
the real world, torture is illegal, we should now point out some
of the differences between these two worlds.
In the television show, Jack Bauer acts as a lone wolf, with a
handful of loyal supporters. In fact, many of the show's subplots
describe his struggles with CTU, the agency with which he is
nominally affiliated. During the torture of Syed Ali, for exam-
ple, he violates a direct order from the President of the United
States to scale back his interrogation tactics.45 In reality, ex-
traordinary rendition requires coordinated action of different
government agencies, regularized practices, and some degree of
institutionalization. The CIA must hire chartered jets, set up
dummy companies, arrange to use U.S. military facilities, divert
agents from their normal duties, find competent translators, de-
velop relationships with non-U.S. intelligence bureaus, pay sup-
port staff, and, of course, implement highly structured and pre-
cise procedures for keeping all of these actions secret. As former
CIA Agent Dan Coleman told the New Yorker, referring to ex-
45. See 24: Day 2: 6:00p.m. - 7:00p.m. (Fox Broad. Co. television broadcast Feb. 4,
2003); 24: Day 2: 7:00 p.m. - 8:00 p.m. (Fox Broad. Co. television broadcast Feb. 11,
2003). It is true that in later seasons, Counter Terrorism Unit ("CTU") itself engages in
torture. In two cases, both involving internal moles within CTU, torture scenes do seem
to follow some sort of government protocol. See 24: Day 3: 7:00p.m. - 8:00p.m., supra
note 16; 24: Day 4: 2:00p.m. - 3:00p.m., supra note 17. The show does not address the
implications for workplace morale of having a standing policy of torturing one's own
employees for alleged disloyalty.
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traordinary rendition, "[t]orture . . . has become bureaucra-
tized."46
The bureaucratization of extraordinary rendition entails an
entire set of potential dysfunctional consequences that are invisi-
ble under the normal "mad bomber" scenario. Bureaucracies
create incentives for careerist behavior such as hiding mistakes
and staying with bad decisions in order to avoid damaging one's
reputation."7 In his book State of War, journalistJames Risen sug-
gests that such incentives have already affected the extraordinary
rendition program:
One CIA officer, haunted by what he saw in one particular
rendition, described the case to the author. This officer al-
leged that the CIA flew a prisoner from Afghanistan to a
country in the Persian Gulf-where he was to be turned over
to local authorities and imprisoned again-despite knowing
that he was an innocent man who had been wrongly identi-
fied as a terrorist. The CIA officer said he believed that the
CIA was moving the prisoner in order to hide its mistake."8
Mistakes like these, involving the imprisonment of innocent peo-
ple, are particularly tempting to hide because the very secrecy of
the program ensures that no one outside the government, and
very few within it, will ever have standing to question the guilt of
these people. This perhaps explains why Maher Arar, the Cana-
dian citizen, was imprisoned in Syria for over a year and a half
after sustained torture and other interrogation indicated that he
had nothing to offer the authorities.
During the Bush Administration, the dangers of bureaucra-
tization have been doubled by what Risen, Seymour Hersh, and
others describe as the politicization of the intelligence commu-
nity. Risen describes the process in the context of intelligence
concerning the Iraq War: "Agency officials who appeared to be
unenthusiastic about Iraq soon mysteriously found themselves
sidelined, while their more eager and ambitious colleagues be-
gan to rise, both within the Directorate of Operations and in the
46. Mayer, supra note 18, at 110.
47. See MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY. AN OUTLINE OF INTERPRETIVE SOCIOL-
OGY 992 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., Ephraim Fischoff et al., trans., 1968)
("Bureaucratic administration always tends to exclude the public, to hide its knowledge
and actions from criticism as well as it can.").
48. JAMES RISEN, STATE OF WAR: THE SECRET HISTORy OF THE CIA AND THE BusH
ADMINISTRATION 34 (2006)
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Directorate of Intelligence, the analytical arm."49 In the case of
extraordinary rendition, as well as U.S.-based examples of ex-
treme interrogation, such a system of incentives might effectively
create a market failure in the intelligence community. As we will
examine in more detail below, interrogation under pain of tor-
ture has an ability, unparalleled by other methods of intelligence
gathering, to confirm the prejudices of the interrogators. In an
environment where one's superiors want information that will
reinforce their own views, torture has a distinct advantage over,
for example, forensics. Thus, tactics such as extraordinary rendi-
tion and extreme interrogation begin to out-compete other
forms of intelligence, not on the basis of their utility, but on the
basis of their political expediency.
Extraordinary rendition also differs from the plots of 24 in
terms of their respective timing. In the show, there are only
hours or even minutes left to find the one crucial piece of intelli-
gence. In reality, detainees are often tortured for months, with-
out reference to any specific terrorist plot. Although we cannot
know for sure whether extraordinary rendition has succeeded in
stopping any mad bombers-since the program's successes, as
well as its failures, would presumably be secret-we have at least
two good reasons to believe such instances are rare or non-exis-
tent. First, the experience of other Western democracies sug-
gests that this is the case. Tom Parker, a former officer for the
British security agency known as "MI5," reported the following
to Jane Mayer of the New Yorker:
[Regardless of the effectiveness of torture] a larger problem
is that many detainees have "nothing to tell." For many years
... British authorities subjected members of the Irish Repub-
lican Army to forceful interrogations, but, in the end, the gov-
ernment concluded that "detainees aren't valuable." A more
effective strategy... was "being creative" about human intelli-
gence gathering, such as infiltration and eavesdropping. 50
Second, the nature of the threat from Islamic terrorist orga-
nizations has changed in the five years since September 11, 2001.
Seymour Hersh argues that since the War in Afghanistan, the Al
Qaeda organization-with its budget, training camps, and orga-
49. Id. at 76.
50. Mayer, supra note 18, at 117.
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nizational hierarchy-has largely disbanded.5" In its place are
discrete and essentially unaffiliated cells that take on the Al
Qaeda "brand name" and engage in the tactics of "leaderless re-
sistance" such as copycat actions. 5 2 Interrogations are typically
of limited use against leaderless resistance cells, because no one
person is likely to be privy to the plans of those in other cells.
Ironically, considering that its advocates justify extraordi-
nary rendition on grounds of urgency, CIA insiders predict that
any given rendition might commit resources and personnel for
years into the future. According to Jamie Gorelick, a former
Deputy Attorney General and member of the 9/11 Commission,
suspects who are rendered over to other governments and tor-
tured cannot be reincorporated into the U.S. justice system by
means of criminal prosecution, since much of the evidence ob-
tained from them would be inadmissible.53 Because the CIA has
a great incentive to keep rendered prisoners-including inno-
cent ones-out of the public eye, it must either convince govern-
ments to hold onto them on assurance of secrecy (which may,
increasingly, give these governments political leverage over the
United States) or make plans to get into the prison business for
decades to come. As Gorelick argues: "In criminal justice, you
either prosecute the suspects or let them go. But if you've
treated them in ways that won't allow you to prosecute them
you're in this no man's land. What do you do with these peo-
ple?")54
Finally, the torture that occurs on 24 typically yields fast, ac-
tionable intelligence, and frequently leads to no long-term con-
sequences to the victim. In Season Four, Sarah, wrongly accused
of being a "mole" and tortured with electric shocks, even accepts
an apology from CTU and an invitation to rejoin the agency. 55
In countries such as Syria, Egypt, and Thailand that have re-
51. See SEYMOUR M. HERSH, CHAIN OF COMMAND: THE ROAD FROM 9/11 TO ABU
GHRAIB 92 (2004).
52. See Simson L. Garfinkel, Leaderless Resistance Today, FIRsT MONDAY, Mar. 2003,
http://www.firstmonday.org/issues/issue8-3/garfinkel/ (last visited Apr. 19, 2007).
But see Mark Mazzetti & David Rohde, Signs of Qaeda Resurgence, INT'L HERALD TRIB.,
Feb. 19, 2007, at 1 (reporting that Al Qaeda has been regrouping and growing in north-
ern Pakistan).
53. See Mayer, supra note 18, at 108.
54. Id.
55. 24: Day 4: 4:00p.m. - 5:00p.m. (Fox Broad. Co. television broadcast Feb. 21,
2005).
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ceived rendered prisoners from the United States, the intelli-
gence outcome of torture is less certain, but the impact on vic-
tims is certainly more profound. 6
Concerning the effectiveness of torture, Fred Kaplan has
noted that "[1]iberals have a tendency to accept, all too eagerly,
the argument that torture is ineffective, that it doesn't yield use-
ful information, that a tortured detainee will tell his inquisitors
whatever they want to hear."57 On the other hand, hard data
concerning the effectiveness of torture is also hard to come by.
In a recent column in the Washington Post, Anne Applebaum
cites a study by French academic Darius Rejali, who recently
trolled through French archives concerning the war with Alge-
rian rebels and found no clear examples of how torture helped
the French.5" Applebaum also refers to, as anecdotal evidence,
the statements by U.S. interrogators in Vietnam who avoided tor-
ture because they found it ineffective and even counterproduc-
tive, despite pressure from their superiors for immediate re-
sults.59 Similarly, Jane Mayer cites a former British military inter-
rogator who regards torture as useless for various reasons.60 Of
course, this anecdotal evidence must be taken with a grain of
salt: U.S. interrogators who did find torture effective are un-
likely to go public with the fact.
In her book The Body in Pain, Elaine Scarry offers one intui-
tively plausible explanation for why torture can seem so simulta-
neously effective and ineffective.6" The Body in Pain, it should be
noted, is concerned with truly unrestrained examples of torture,
such as the application of a dentist's drill to a nerve for four
hours a day for twenty-nine straight days.6 2 Such tactics are likely
similar to those experienced by contemporary prisoners in Syria
or Egypt. In these cases, the purpose of the torture is to inflict
56. 24, for all of its graphic realism, has never depicted one of the principal weap-
ons of all of these regimes: sexual abuse. See U.S. DEPr. OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS
ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES: EGvr 2005 (Mar. 8, 2006), available at http://www.state.
gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61687.htm (last visited Mar. 30, 2007).
57. Fred Kaplan, Does Torture Work?, SLATE, Sep. 14, 2004, http://www.slate.com/
id/2106702 (last visited Apr. 19, 2007).
58. See Anne Applebaum, The Torture Myth, WASH. POST, Jan. 12, 2005, at A21.
59. See id.
60. See, e.g., Mayer, supra note 18.
61. ELAINE ScARRY, THE BODY IN PAIN: THE MAKING AND UNMAKING OF THE WORLD
(1985).
62. Id. at 34.
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pain so unbearable that it destroys the victim's entire mental
world, including not only political allegiances, but all loves, loyal-
ties, and trust, including love and trust of oneself. Scarry states:
"The [interrogator's] very question that, within the political pre-
tense, matters so much to the torturer that it occasions his gro-
tesque brutality will matter so little to the prisoner experiencing
the brutality that he will give the answer."63 Of course, at this
point, the distinction between truth and lies matter equally little
to the prisoner. As torture destroys one's ability to lie, it also
destroys one's inner allegiance to the truth. To drive her point
home, Scarry quotes the slogan of a South Vietnamese torturer:
"If you are not Vietcong, we will beat you until you admit you
are; and if you admit you are, we will beat you until you no
longer dare to be one."64 The problem is not that torture can-
not produce truth, but that it is extremely difficult-not only to
the torturer but also to the victim-to distinguish what is a con-
fession and what is a convenient lie.
In 24, the extremeness of torture is separated from its effec-
tiveness. No matter how ferocious the actual interrogation is, it
never advances to the level of complete destruction of one's in-
ner world. Typically, in the real-time conceit of the show, an
interrogation will take, at most, an hour (of which, less than two
minutes is actually shown on the screen). After the interroga-
tion ends, the victim has usually given up the appropriate infor-
mation, but the victim's world and dignity are left intact to such
an extent that the victim not only forgives but continues working
with the torturer. Under such completely unrealistic circum-
stances, it is possible to imagine that torture does have primarily
an information gathering function, and that however brutal it
appears, it is but a temporary, emergency blip in the lives of its
participants.
As Scarry argues, the really naive people are not those who
doubt torture's effectiveness at revealing true information (al-
though they might be at least partially incorrect), but those who
think torture is always motivated primarily by a desire to reveal
information or that revealing information is its most important
consequence. Scarry says: "It is crucial to see that the interroga-
tion does not stand outside an episode [of torture] as its motive
63. Id. at 29.
64. Id. at 42.
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or justification: it is internal to the structure of torture, exists
there because of its intimate connections to and interactions
with the physical pain."65 Even when the prisoner has little or no
valuable information and the torturer has complete control over
the prisoner's body, the torturer's "need-to-know" preserves the
fiction that there is still, between the two, a battle of wills. Of
course, the outcome of this battle is preordained: the prisoner
will be broken. The point of the whole exercise is to create an
illusion that the torturer, and the regime he represents, has the
power to reach into even the deepest recesses of one's mind.66
Therefore, it should not be surprising that torture occurs most
commonly when the self-image of a regime is most unstable.
Under such circumstances, torture either tends to push out
other, possibly more effective, methods of intelligence gather-
ing, or those other methods are deployed primarily in the ser-
vice of collecting torture victims.
III. EXTRA ORDINARY RENDITION UNDERMINES THE
RULE OF LAW
Despite all evidence to the contrary, it remains theoretically
conceivable that a lone wolf hero might engage in restrained tor-
ture for the sole sake of extracting information that is needed to
avert an imminent attack. Yet, to accommodate what must be
extremely rare occurrences, the U.S. Government has estab-
lished a standing bureaucracy. Press reports indicate that the
government has procured airplanes, arranged for and made rou-
tine special procedures for transporting detainees, and assigned
trained government agents to oversee extraordinary rendition
operations. We can guess that it has also developed standard
procedures for parsing the information supplied by govern-
ments and has worked with torturers to draw up goals and strate-
gies for interrogations. This is one of the things that is most
alarming about extraordinary rendition: Not only have human
65. Id. at 29.
66. The power is illusory for two reasons: (1) the real power over the individual
comes from within-from the body's own capacity to create pain-without which the
torturer's efforts would be pointless, except as a particularly inefficient way of injuring
the victim; and (2) the exercise of inflicting pain on a prisoner who is at one's complete
mercy is, logistically speaking, not that difficult. States, private groups, and even indi-
viduals who lack the resources to wage open warfare nonetheless can build, equip, and
staff fully functional torture chambers.
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rights standards broken down in emergency situations, but the
violation of these rights has, in contradiction of U.S. law, be-
come institutionalized-with a chain of command, a budget,
and all the trappings of bureaucracy.
Only when we understand how implausible the picture of
the principled, driven lone wolf truly is can we turn back to con-
sider what should happen in a "mad bomber" moral dilemma.
Most of us do not have much intuitive sympathy for the rigid
moral position that one should never violate a legitimate law, no
matter what the consequences. Most people would think twice
about opening themselves up to a friend who would give away
their hiding place to avoid lying to the police. If the genuine,
industrial-strength Jack Bauer situation occurred-if, for exam-
ple, if one knew for certain that millions would die unless one
tortured an individual who was likely a bad person himself-
most people would find a purely moralistic view oppressive.
Additionally, it is reasonable to speculate that most people
would agree that breaking a legitimate law for a good reason
should not excuse a person from the law's consequences. This is
the nature of civil disobedience. When Martin Luther King, Jr.'s
Southern Christian Leadership Conference was organizing di-
rect action protests in Birmingham, Alabama, its leaders repeat-
edly asked themselves: "Are you able to endure the ordeal of
jail?"6 7 Ministers, mothers, students, and low-wage laborers all
were able to say "yes." It is fair to say that those who did spend
time in jail as a result of their involvement in the civil rights
movement today wear their sentences as a badge of honor and a
sign of their convictions.
If an instance of torture is morally necessary to save a large
number of people, then the would-be torturer should be re-
quired to ask himself the same question. Jack Bauer (or his real-
world equivalent) should be capable of exhibiting the same
courage as elderly women did in the civil rights movement. In
the case of systematic violations of the law, such as those that
evidently have occurred during the program of extraordinary
renditions, the leaders who ordered these programs and who
had knowledge of the violations similarly ought to have asked
themselves the question: "Are you able to endure the ordeal of
67. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., WHY WE CAN'T WAIT 80 (1964).
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jail?"68 Investigations will reveal to the public whether their vio-
lations of law served justice and humanity. If they did, then they
too can wear their convictions as a badge of honor. But U.S.
Government leaders, for their role in furthering and promoting
extraordinary renditions as a way to avoid constitutional and
other legal requirements, should not.
68. Id.
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